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Non-Technical Summary
The resurgence of regionalism has sparked a vast literature on the role of regionalism in a multilateral world. In the popular press, the debate is often couched in terms of \regionalism and |or versus| multilateralism". Are regional integration arrangements (rias)`building blocks' or`stumbling blocks' towards freer global trade and how do they a ect multilateral trading arrangements (mtas)? Though much has been written on the subject, no consensus seems to be emerging beyond the belief that rias are here to stay. A large part of the literature has attempted to nd out whether or not a division of the world economy i n to trading blocs is likely to raise or lower welfare. In that literature, although there are some analyses of tari negotiations, much of the time trade policy derives from optimal tari considerations.
Useful as it is, this literature is both open to criticism (are optimal tari considerations important in trade policy decision-making?) and to the observation that governments are seldom solely economic welfare maximisers. Another literature looks into the political economy o f i n tegration and on the implications of di erent t ypes of institutional arrangements. This paper belongs to that literature, more precisely to the political economy c o n tributions that view regionalism and multilateralism as complementary. W e t a k e the view that regionalism can help sustain multilateralism by emphasizing compensation, an aspect so far neglected. We concentrate on the need to compensate losers from a reduction in protection and on the facilitating role that an ria can play in this regard. This emphasis seems warranted in view of the experience of the rst wave of regionalism, in which the frequent failure of South-South arrangements has been largely attributed to a lack of compensatory mechanisms b etween (often) very unequal partners. By contrast, in the North-South arrangements of the second wave, availability of compensation funds as in the ec's second enlargement, have been instrumental to their success. Indeed observers have argued that the Southern partners in the second ec enlargements would not have opened their economies as much on their own and, most recently, that the Europe Agreements have had a similar e ect on the Central and East European economies.
This paper suggests that regional arrangements such as free-trade areas (ftas) o er three political-economy a d v antages that have been neglected so far. First, they provide a way of compensating losers. Second, they can be designed so as to yield welfare-enhancing reductions in protection for both members and non-members. Finally, b y reducing the average protection of member countries, they help them meet the requirement of`o ers' now required of all World Trade Organization (wto) members when joining regional agreements. This should present a non-negligible advantage for the many newcomers to the wto.
Our argument is the following. Consider two symmetric countries, A and B, whose i trade policy (initially non-discriminatory) is determined as in the political support function literature, that is each country's government trades o contributions from industry lobbies (conditioned on the adoption of distortionary trade taxes), against the social costs that such taxes entail. We show h o w a n fta with rules of origin can enable both countries to reduce selectively external tari s (through a cooperative agreement) while at the same time maintaining producer prices in import-competing sectors at their initial level. Maintaining producer prices is the key to success since it is what guarantees that political support does not decline as a result of the fta's formation. An example will illustrate the argument. Let electronics be an import-competing sector in A and textiles an import-competing sector in B. Neither country is large enough to meet the partner country's import demand at the initial (tari -ridden) domestic prices. Both sectors are initially protected by a non-discriminatory tari . Let now A and B form an fta with rules of origin in which A maintains its pre-fta tari in textiles and eliminates its tari on electronics while B maintains its pre-fta tari in electronics against the rest-of-the world (C) and eliminates its tari textiles.
Under this scenario, free trade within the area enables textiles producers in B to ship their output tari -free to A, enjoying A's protection and likewise for electronics producers in A. As a result, producer prices are unchanged, and governments in both countries can enjoy political support as before the fta. But consumer prices are reduced: consumers in B can now obtain electronics at their world price, and consumers in A can obtain textiles at their world price (consumer-price di erences between A and B cannot be arbitrated because of rules of origin which p r e v ent the trans-shipment of goods originating from the rest-of-the-world through the area's internal borders). In the paper, we show that although tari revenue shrinks, the reduction in consumer prices raises welfare in A and B and the reduction in the average tari of the zone with respect to the rest-of-the-world raises non-member welfare.
Consider next the mta implications of such an arrangement. As member countries have reduced their average tari , they are, as a result of the fta's formation, in a position to o er multilateral tari reductions. Thus, if the bargaining that takes place during the formation of an fta is driven by political-economy considerations, and if |indeed as required by gatt article xxiv| the average tari rate of member countries must be reduced, trade diversion within the fta may w ell turn out to be globally welfare-increasing. In sum, if the cooperative arrangements are properly designed, they can reduce the cost of compensating losers and, in the process, make everyone better o . This compensation mechanism, which i s i n ternal to the fta, i s clearly not available in multilateral negotiations.
ii In sum, if indeed, political-economy considerations are important in the negotiations of ftas, one should observe an \exchange" of protection among members so that post-fta tari structures should be negatively correlated among members. Indirect evidence based on import patterns between the US and Canada are consistent with this prediction.
iii During the American Civil War a friend of mine, who was a careful student of the military operations, used often to remark that the war was one in which the South had all the victories, and the North, all the substantial successes. .... Protectionists do score many victories, or so-called victories. What I wish to point out is the continual and substantial success of Free T rade throughout the world.
Sir Robert Gi en 1 
Introduction
Regionalism is mushrooming and appears to be here to stay. The rst wave, which appeared in the 1960s, was made up primarily of North-North and South-South regional trading arrangements (rias), the latter being generally recognized to have been less successful than the former. Di erent, primarily North-South arrangements appeared during the 1980s in a second wave w h i c h sparked a vast literature on the role of regionalism in a multilateral world. This literature, which w as recently surveyed by Winters (1997) and Panagaryia (1998) Panagariya, 1996) , has largely focused on two issues: (i) Should a division of the world economy i n to regional trading blocs be expected to raise or to lower welfare? (ii) Does regionalism help or hamper multilateral e orts at trade liberalisation?
In most of the literature addressing issue (i), the common rationale for regional and multilateral trading arrangements is to internalize terms-of-trade externalities, as in Krugman (1992) . This approach is probably best suited to analyze the rst wave o f regionalism, although it is not clear that optimal-tari considerations weigh heavily in trade-policy decisions. In addressing issue (ii), the arguments have instead been couched in a political-economy setting emphasizing institutional di erences between various types of regional arrangements. On the negative side, Levy (1997) uses a political-economy approach a l a M a yer (1984) to argue that rias m a y jeopardise the multilateral trading system if they o er disproportionately large gains to agents in integrating countries, raising their reservation utility o ver the multilateral free-trade level. Using the political-support approach to endogenous policy formation (but di erent modelling assumptions) Krishna (1994) and Grossman and Helpman (1995) show that ftas are more likely to be adopted if they are trade diverting, suggesting that politically successful ftas are likely to be of the harmful type. On the positive side, Ethier (1996) interprets the new wave of regionalism as an endogenous response to the development o f t h e m ultilateral system, suggesting that regional integration can spur multilateral liberalization by facilitating coordination. Hillman et al. (1995) also argue that governments exchange market access in the wto or in rias because the mutual political gains conferred by reciprocity l o wer the political costs of trade liberalization.
Although the weight of theoretical conjectures suggests that there is some ground for concern about the spread of regionalism, it is fair to say that the debate is still open, if for no other reason because the historical evidence is itself ambiguous (see Irwin, 1993) . This paper takes the view that whether or not regionalism should be a source of concern, it is probably here to stay therefore, in the words of de Melo and Panagariya (1993) , \a more constructive approach i s t o a s k w h e t h e r m e c hanisms can be devised to ensure that regionalism complements multilateralism and does not fragment the world into inward-looking blocks" (p. 9). In this spirit, we show h o w the external tari structure of a free-trade agreement ( fta) can be designed so as to generate welfare gains while preserving the ability of member countries to protect import-competing interests from the adverse consequences of trade liberalization, thus making the agreement politically viable.
An fta is politically viable if it satis es two criteria. Following Grossman and Helpman (1995), we rst assume that the formation of an fta is on the political agenda and show that the agreement under consideration is politically viable using an extension of their notion of a \pressured stance". 2 We also verify that governments are willing to put the formation of an fta on the political agenda that is, that any decline in equilibrium contributions after the agreement's signature would be o set by e ciency gains. Using this two-step approach, we show ( b y construction) how a n fta with rules of origin can enable both countries to cooperate towards a selective reduction of external tari s while simultaneously maintaining producer prices in import-competing sectors at their initial level, a key condition for continued political support.
An example will illustrate the gist of the argument. Consider two countries (A and B) whose textiles and electronics producers compete with imports from the rest of the world, and suppose that each country is too small in each sector to meet its partner's import demand at the initial (tari -ridden) domestic prices. Let the two countries form an fta with rules of origin in which A maintains an unchanged external tari on textiles but eliminates protection in electronics, while B does the reverse. Free trade within the area enables B's textiles producers to ship their output tari -free to A, enjoying A's protection likewise, A's electronics producers can export to B and enjoy B's protection. Under suitable demand conditions, producer prices are unchanged, so that import-competing interests do not oppose the fta. M o r e o ver, as we s h o w that equilibrium post-fta contributions (based on external tari s) are inferior to pre-fta contributions (based on mfn tari s) by no more than the valuation of the fta's e ciency gains in the objective function of governments, the latter have no reason to oppose placing the formation of the fta on the political agenda. The arrangement's most interesting aspect is that it leads to reduced consumer prices, as B's consumers can now obtain electronics at their world price, while A's ones can obtain textiles at their world price. (Consumer-price di erences between A and B cannot be arbitrated because of rules of origin, which prevent the trans-shipment of goods originating from the rest of the world through the area's internal borders.) Although tari revenue shrinks in both countries, we s h o w that the consumer-price reductions raise welfare in A and B with no opposition from import-competing lobbies, these welfare gains are su cient t o m a k e the agreement politically viable.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model used in section 3 to establish an fta that is politically viable and globally welfareenhancing. Section 4 introduces extensions (no compensation, asymmetric partners), discusses consistency with gatt article xxiv and gives prima facie evidence for the Canada-U.S. fta (cusfta). Section 5 concludes.
The model
Two small (price-taking) and symmetric 3 countries, A and B, produce and consume three goods, labelled 1, 2 and 3. Consumers have identical, quasilinear preferences. Goods 1 and 2 are made with sector-speci c capital and intersectorally mobile labour. The presence of a xed endowment of speci c capital generates diminishing returns in sectors 1 and 2, whereas sector 3 employs only labour under constant returns to scale. Thus, the productivity of labour in sector 3 determines the economywide wage rate, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994) . Both countries import goods 1 and 2 from the rest of the world and export good 3 to it, with no transportation costs between any pair of countries. Good 3 serves as num eraire.
We model the formation of an fta in a two-period framework. This intertemporal aspect is not introduced for its own sake, but only to highlight an important distinction between two t ypes of political contributions. In period 1, each country's trade policy is nondiscriminatory and is determined as the outcome of a domestic political game a l a Grossman-Helpman, in which lobbies representing owners of speci c capital bid for protection with truthful contribution schedules. 4 We will call these contributions`type-1' contributions. At the end of period 1, governments decide whether or not to put the formation of an fta on the political agenda in A and B if they do, lobbies contribute, once and for all, in favour of the agreement or against it. We will call these one-o contributions`type-2' contributions. If the agreement is adopted, the governments of A and B seek again type-1 contributions in period 2, but now conditioned on external rather than mfn tari s, and they act cooperatively, maximizing a joint objective function. If the agreement is rejected, period 2 is identical to period 1. The political viability of the fta, if it is on the political agenda, depends on the welfare gains it is able to generate and on the net sum of aggregate type-2 contributions. Whether or not governments are willing to put it on the agenda depends not only on type-2 contributions and welfare e ects, but also on a comparison of the level of type-1 contributions before and after the agreement.
With a nite time horizon and no links between periods in either demand or supply functions, the intertemporal aspects of the game can be disregarded and the equilibrium calculated separately for each period. Accordingly, t wo problems must be considered: one in which g o vernments use mfn tari s, characterized below, and one in which they use external tari s in an fta, s o l v ed in section 3.
To rule out unnecessary complications, as in Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (1996), we assume that capital ownership is su ciently concentrated to ensure that industry lobbies disregard the e ect of trade protection on the cost of living. 5 Sector 3 is not allowed to lobby for export subsidies. Normalizing world prices to unity in all sectors and letting t i k be country i's tari in sector k, the domestic price of good k in i is p i k = 1 + t i k (consumer and producer prices are equivalent). Type-1 contributions C i k from producers of good k (k = 1 2) in i can be written as C i k (t i k b i k ) for some constants b i k , whose determination is discussed in section 3. Welfare is W i (t i 1 t i 2 ).
Using vector notation, t i = ( t i
, and the government's problem in country i can be written as
for some constant a. Let t i be the solution to problem (1) we will use bars to indicate variables evaluated at their period-1 (pre-fta) equilibrium values. It is shown in Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (1996) that, under quasilinear preferences, @W i =@t i k = ( m i k ) 0 t i k , where (m i k ) 0 is the own-price derivative of country i's importdemand function in sector k. T h us, ignoring corner solutions at free trade (import subsidies are not allowed) t i satis es the rst-order condition
We need to impose the technical condition that at the period-1 equilibrium level of tari s t i , the combined output of A and B does not exceed the demand from each one of them individually. F ormally, lett i k be de ned by y A k (1+t i k )+y B k (1+t i k ) c i k (1+t i k ) where y i k and c i k are respectively i's output and consumption of good k. The condition can be stated concisely as: Assumption 1 t i k t i k for k = 1 2 and i = A B.
Given that A and B are symmetric, Assumption 1 means that in the period-1 (prefta) equilibrium, import-penetration ratios in sectors 1 and 2 are at least equal to one half (as y A k + y B k = 2 y i k c i k for i = A B).
Compensating losers in an FTA
Before we turn to the formal analysis of the agreement's political viability, w e need to state a technical result rst established by Richardson (1993) namely, t h a t a n fta introduces a wedge between the consumer and producer prices of imported goods, provided that rules of origin prevent consumer arbitrage. (We de ne rules of origin as regulations preventing the transshipment of goods from the rest of the world through the area's internal borders.) More precisely, i n a n fta with rules of origin, producer prices are necessarily equalized across the area, whereas consumer prices are not. 6 We will denote producer prices by p i k and consumer prices by q i k let also t = ( t A 1 t A 2 t B 1 t B 2 ) be the the area's external tari vector.
Lemma 1 (Richardson, 1993) In an fta with rules of origin and satisfying Assumption 1, the consumer price of good k is q i k = 1 + t i k in country i, but its producer price is p i k = 1 + m a x ft A k t B k g in the entire area.
Proof If t A k = t B k , the lemma holds trivially suppose that t A k 6 = t B k , and label countries so that t A k > t B k . As transportation costs are nil between A and B, B's producers sell in A a s t A k t A k , they can sell their entire output without depressing k's market price in A. T h us, the price relevant t o B's producers is not 1 + t B k , but 1 + t A k : producer prices are equalized at p B k = p A k = 1 + t A k . A s B's output is shipped 6 The reader may w onder why symmetric countries would ever want t o s e t d i e r e n t tari s. In the initial (period-1) equilibrium, no strategic interaction exists between A and B in such a context, symmetry implies that they must set equal tari s. But in a strategic context like a n fta, asymmetric tari s can emerge both in cooperative and noncooperative settings (see e.g. Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga, 1996) . entirely to A, B's consumption is met by imports from the rest of the world priced at q B k = 1 + t B k . I n A, rules of origin prevent consumers from purchasing quantities of good k imported by B from the rest of the world consequently, q A k = 1 + t A k (= p A k ). Thus, q B k = 1 + t B k < q A k = 1 + t A k . 2
Lemma 1 highlights the key role played by rules of origin in an fta. T ogether with Assumption 1, rules of origin ensure that the price of k in the more protected market (A) is sheltered from downward pressure arising from the relatively low price prevailing in the less-protected market (B). As a result, if B forms an fta with A while simultaneously reducing its external tari on k, its producers can avoid being exposed to the competitive pressure of imports from the rest of the world by simply diverting their output to A's protected market. Stated di erently, rules of origin enable A tò export its protection' to B, as Krueger (1993) rst noted (although Krueger was referring to the protection extended to intermediate-goods producers when nal goods are subject to rules of origin in an fta). This is the mechanism on which w e r e l y t o protect losers from trade liberalization. Suppose now that the formation of an fta is on the political agenda, and consider the following proposal. Barriers to intra-bloc trade (i.e. to trade between A and B) are, of course, to be removed. But in addition, A and B agree to set their external tari s cooperatively 7 : A eliminates its external tari on good 1 and maintains an external tari on good 2 just equal to its pre-fta mfn tari , while B does the reverse. Loosely speaking, an fta will be said to be politically viable if the sum across partners of contributions for and against the fta and economic e ciency (properly weighted) is positive. More precisely, the following must hold. In each country, lobbies o er type-2 contributions for or against the fta to their government. 8 Grossman and Helpman (1995), who pioneered this approach, showed that truthful contributions are in this context simple amounts related to the loss or gain that the lobbies expect 7 Although A and B agree to set external tari s cooperatively, they still set them separately, unlike in a customs union, where they would necessarily agree on a common external tari . 8 Because the opportunity to form an fta occurs only once in our two-period framework, participating governments are necessarily committed to staying in the fta once it is formed. In an in nite-horizon model, some mechanism |like a n e n try-and-exit cost| would be needed to prevent g o vernments from renegotiating the participation issue with their lobbies. We are grateful to Raquel Fernandez for attracting our attention to this issue. from the fta. T h us, if lobby k expects to gain from the agreement, it will o er a contribution 0 F i k i k (the change in industry pro ts attributable to the fta) in its favour if it expects to lose, it will o er a contribution 0 N i k ; i k against it. We will call F i the set of sectors such that i k 0 and N i the set of sectors such that i k < 0. If the fta is implemented, in equilibrium the government of each country must be just indi erent b e t ween implementing it or not, otherwise lobbies on the winning side could reduce their contributions without altering the outcome. Thus, lobbies on the losing side (those who oppose the agreement) must bid the whole valuation of their expected losses, implying that N i k = ; i k for all k 2 N i .
In this section, we assume that A and B can use inter-country transfers to compensate for tari -revenue losses due to the agreement section 4 shows how the fta can be implemented without such transfers. Let W i denote the welfare change attributable to the agreement. De nition 1 extends Grossman and Helpman's de nition of a`pressured stance' to a context where compensatory transfers are possible we use it in the following proposition to construct an external tari structure that ensures the fta's politically viability and maximizes the sum of the member countries' domestic objective functions V A and V B , given truthful contribution schedules. Lett 
2
Given that aggregate type-2 contributions in favor of the fta are nil, it remains to be shown that membergovernments are willing to put it on the political agenda in the rst place, i.e., that the net e ect of the agreement's e ciency gains and of any variation in type-1 contributions after its signature would leave the governments of A and B at least as well o as before in terms of V . Strictly speaking, governments could trade o positive net type-2 contributions against the discounted value of any drop in type-1 contributions after the agreement. However, we will show below that such a n i n tertemporal trade-o needs not be envisaged here.
In Proposition 2 demonstrates that the utility o f g o vernments, inclusive o f t ype-1 contributions, is una ected by the formation of the fta. This result seems at odds with that of Proposition 1, which established that producers were indi erent to the fta but that governments weren't because of welfare gains. The reason for this apparent discrepancy is that lobbies are able to appropriate all the e ciency gains generated by the move f r o m mfn tari s to a regional arrangement through reduced type-1 contributions rather than increased pro ts. In turn, the ability of lobbies to appropriate the entire rents from protection (and consequently the e ciency gains generated by a n fta) stems from the absence of inter-lobby rivalry in a model where the wage rate is xed and cost-of-living externalities are not recognized. Should some element o f r i v alry be present, the basic result of this paper |namely, that an appropriately-designed fta is politically viable| would remain valid (indeed, it would be strengthened), but member governments would be able to retain some of the induced e ciency gains.
Note also that the welfare-maximising tari vector that is politically viable in the sense of de nition 1 will be such that the tari in the protected sector in country A will be smaller than t. T o see this note that by l o wering the tari in the protected, welfare unambiguously increase but at the same time, rms start opposing the fta. As at t the fta is`strictly' politically viable, in the sense that the inequality i n de nition 1 is strictly positive, as shown in proposition 1, then by continuity there exists a tari lower than t that satis es the political constraint and procures further welfare gains.
Extensions and applications

Implementation without compensatory transfers
The fta constructed in Proposition 1 relies on monetary transfers between members. In the present framework, where governments trade o domestic welfare against monetary contributions from lobbies, inter-country transfers to compensate for welfare losses are quite natural. Moreover, such transfers are common in rias (a prominent example is the structural-funds system in the European Union). Indeed, Sapir (1993) stressed the role of compensation funds in the success of the ec's second enlargement to Southern European countries. By contrast, the fact that many of the early South-South regional agreements of the 1960s failed has been largely attributed to the lack of compensatory mechanisms b e t ween unequal partners (see e.g. Foroutan, 1993) . However, one may object that there is a logical inconsistency in ruling out lump-sum transfers domestically (such transfers would enable governments to solve income-distribution problems without having recourse to distortionary trade taxes) while at the same time using them to solve distributional problems between coun-tries. Therefore, we consider in this section how the fta characterized in Proposition 1 can be implemented without compensatory transfers. Let us call \import goods" the goods imported by the regional bloc from the rest of the world (goods 1 and 2 in our example).
Corollary 1 The fta characterized in Proposition 1 is politically viable without compensatory transfers whenever the price elasticity of demand for import goods is su ciently large in both member countries. Corollary 2 has a normative implication beyond that of Proposition 1. The welfare e ciency of any given fta can be enhanced at no political cost by selective elimination of external tari s, pairwise, in sectors with high demand elasticities. 10 Such a m o ve, while preserving across-the-board internal free trade, would allow m e m ber countries to exchange protection among themselves while generating consumer-surplus gains. It is also worth noting that, if trade protection took the form of quantitative restrictions, importing countries would typically retain only a fraction of the quota rents, so that the issue of compensation for loss of such rents would lose importance.
Asymmetric FTA partners
While the symmetry assumption permits the construction of a clearcut argument at minimum computational cost, it is too strong to provide a basis for policy prescriptions. Its role in our analysis is to ensure that period-1 mfn tari s are equal, so that producers in import-competing sectors are indi erent b e t ween selling at home or abroad at the initial tari vector. Suppose, then, that tari s are not equal in period 1. The fta's external tari structure must provide undiminished protection to producers in the whole area while opening up one country in each sector to external competition. This dual requirement, which is the essence of our argument, can be achieved by setting, in each sector, an external tari equal to max f t A k t B k g in one country and zero in the other one. (The availability of compensatory transfers makes the identity of each country irrelevant.) Then, in both of the area's import-competing sectors, the common producer price is at least as high as it was in either country before the fta. As a result, import-competing interests do not oppose the agreement in fact, producers of good k in the country that was initially the least protectionist in sector k support the agreement, as internal free trade enables them to share in the other country's high level of protection. However, one country's producer-surplus gains are the other's tari -revenue losses, and the net e ect on the agreement's political viability depends on the parameter a, i n troducing an indeterminacy that symmetry avoids. As for consumer-surplus gains, they are ensured, as in the symmetric case, by the elimination of one member's external tari in each sector. Thus, relaxing the symmetry assumption does not a ect the logic of our argument but clouds it with an indeterminacy of little practical signi cance, since it hinges on the unmeasurable parameter a.
Implications for GATT's article XXIV
It is easy to verify that the external tari structure set up in Proposition 1, i.e., t = ( t A 1 0 0 t B 2 ), is in conformity with article xxiv of the gatt and its 1994 understanding: As required, the fta covers all trade, and the area's import-weighted average external tari is smaller than before, as no tari is raised while two are eliminated. Thus, the fta is wto-consistent. 11 The argument can be carried one step further. Article xxiv's requirement that no tari be raised applies on a country-by-country basis, rather than on the area's average external tari . Thus, the fact that some countries reduce their external tari s when joining an fta cannot be used by others to raise theirs, even if the area's average external tari ends up lower than before the agreement. By contrast, when countries form a customs union, Article xxiv allows for compensatory changes at the tari -line level among member countries according to the mechanism stipulated in article xxviii. That is, a country can raise its external tari provided that other member countries reduce theirs by a \su cient" amount when converging to the common external tari . Altough the formation of preferential trading agreements under Article xxiv has been considered by some observers as a`loophole' in the mfn principle that ought to be eliminated, our analysis suggests that a case might in fact be made for an extension of Article xxiv |speci cally, w e suggest that the more exible criterion applied by the wto to customs unions should be extended to ftas. The reason is that whereas the trade diversion making piecemeal external liberalization palatable to import-competing lobbies is costless in our model, it is unlikely to be so in reality. T h us, import-competing sectors forced to redirect their activity a way from their domestic market to a more protected partner country may demand increased external protection in the latter. Such an increase in external protection in one of the member countries would violate Article xxiv in its present form, even if it were compensated by the elimination of external protection in other member countries. This, in our view, creates unnecessary hurdles on the political viability o f ftas regardless of their potential to raise world welfare. 12 
Prima Facie evidence: The Canada-US FTA
If compensating the losers from trade liberalization matters in the political-economy process leading to the formation of regional trading agreements, Proposition 1 suggests that the changes in external tari structures following the formation of an fta should be negatively correlated across members. That is, whenever a member country maintains substantial external protection in a given sector, other members can a ord to reduce their own protection in that sector while returning the favor in other ones (provided that the supply and demand conditions characterized in Assumption 1 hold). If e ective, this exchange of protection among member countries should be re ected in trade patterns: the growth of intra-bloc trade in import-competing sectors (with goods owing from relatively open member countries to more protected ones) should be correlated with the growth of imports from the rest of the world to those relatively open member countries.
We c hecked indirectly for those predictions using Canada-us sitc trade data at the 4-digit level (816 tari lines) before and after the signature of the Canada-us fta (cusfta) in 1987. Although trade ows measure changes in protection only indirectly (and no doubt pick up other e ects as well), they have the advantage of also capturing the e ect of non-tari barriers, which w ould otherwise be di cult to quantify. W e estimated panel regressions on growth rates of exports and imports at the tari -line level, using a \between-regressor" technique (to get rid of general time trends) for two sub-periods: 1983-1987 (3264 observations) and 1988-1996 (7344 observations). First, we regressed average growth rates of Canadian exports to the us on average growth rates of Canadian imports from the rest of the world at the tari -line level for the period 1983-1987. The estimated coe cient (-0.16E-6) was insigni cant, with a t-statistic of -0.06. The same regression run on the 1988-1996 period gave an estimate of 0.28, signi cant a t t h e 9 9 % ( t-statistic of 4.5). Qualitatively similar results were obtained when regressing the average rate of growth of us exports to Canada on us imports from the rest of the world at the tari -line level.
These correlations are only suggestive and should, of course, be interpreted with caution, as many factors other than cusfta and the Uruguay Round negotiations may have contributed to shape trade patterns between Canada and the us. Nonetheless, they appear to be at least consistent with the implications of the kind of politicaleconomy considerations analyzed in this paper.
Concluding remarks
Whereas ftas are often considered, for a variety of reasons, as worse arrangements than customs unions (see e.g. Krueger, 1997) , this paper purported to show that the ability of member countries to maintain di erent degrees of external protection in an fta can in fact be used to mitigate the impact of existing protectionist pressures.
The argument is, in essence, a very simple one: if it is generally acknowledged that members of an fta exchange market access for their domestic exporters, we show that they can also exchange protection for the bene t of their import-competing interests, and that they can do so at lower welfare costs than if each member had to protect each and every one of its import-competing industries. Clearly, this is a secondbest argument requiring some sort of political-viability constraint but constraints of that sort are prevalent in actual policy-making, and our preliminary check o n US-Canada data suggests that they may indeed exert a signi cant in uence on tradepolicy outcomes, along the lines predicted by our results.
A s a b y-product of our analysis, we h a ve highlighted three types of advantages o ered by ftas which h a ve hitherto been neglected in the literature. First, they provide a way of compensating losers, an aspect largely overlooked (except for Hillman et al., 1995) , but of key practical importance. 13 Second, following the logic of Kemp and Wan (1976) , ftas can be designed so as to yield welfare-enhancing reductions in protection (this issue is analyzed formally in a recent paper by Krishna and Panagariya, 1998) . Finally, b y reducing the average external protection of member countries, they can help meet the requirement of`o ers' that wto members face when joining regional agreements (for instance, Argentina and Uruguay decreased their average external tari from 40% in 1986 to 12% in 1996 while forming the Mercosur with Brazil and Paraguay). This can represent a non-negligible advantage for the many newcomers to the wto.
